In this Introduction, I will say a few words about Robin Lovin's interesting conference paper 3 on the work of John Courtney Murray 4 and then preview three points of my own, which are aimed at putting Murray's work in context and at amplifying several matters touched on by Professor Lovin.
At the beginning of his conference paper, Professor Lovin observes that Murray was occupied by "two related tasks" from the late 1940s through the time of the Vatican Council. Professor Lovin elaborates:
One [task] was theological and ecclesiastical: making a case for religious freedom as a Catholic doctrine essential to the Catholic understanding of human dignity. The other was political and social: explaining that Catholic doctrine in relation to an American constitutional system that enacted freedom of religion primarily through the institutional separation of church and state and setting the terms for a dialogue that would establish the practical meaning of religious freedom under the concrete conditions of a pluralistic democracy.
Interestingly, the most that Professor Lovin can say is that Murray "was responsive to these changes." Murray was not necessarily a thought leader in those years.
Professor Lovin makes two additional observations that also warrant some discussion. The first is that Murray thought that " [t] he point of the public argument is not just to be heard. The point is to shape policy and legislation. Murray was clear about that. But argument also involves a prudent discernment of what the limits of policy are, and what cannot be legislated." 8 The second is that, for Murray, the purpose of this mode of encounter is winning the argument. Professor Lovin observes that, for Murray, "the work of the public theologian is to bring the resources and convictions of the Christian tradition to bear on the public argument, in order to shape the public choices. This is not a matter of imposing a religious authority, but it is about winning the argument." 9 Taking these observations as a starting point, I will make three points. First, I would like to float a somewhat contrarian idea: Murray was both an important contributor to the work of the Council and an important figure in the history of American public theology, but perhaps we tend to overstate his contribution to Catholic thought on the subject of democracy, human rights, and freedom of religion. In part, that is because many of us are conditioned to indulge a false assumption that Catholic thought is monolithic in nature, and that the official pronouncements of popes and councils are the only relevant sources of Catholic belief and practice. Ironically, that is an assumption that has been encouraged both by the Catholic hierarchy and by the Church's external critics, 10 but it overlooks a long tradition of a highly diverse field of Catholic democratic thought and practice among the clergy and the laity. In other words, Murray's work played an important role at the Council, but much work already had been done.
Second, as Professor Lovin correctly notes, the world did change in many ways shortly after Murray published his book, but I would like to suggest that the world had also changed in numerous and important ways before the book was published. The place of Catholics in American society had changed a great deal, for example, while racism continued to be a central feature of "the American proposition."' 1 I For that reason, it is difficult today to read Murray's work without being struck by the virtual absence of any discussion of racial segregation, racial prejudice, or the practical exclusion of African Americans from meaningful participation in the political life of the country. Indeed, Murray's only mention of the issue is a brief aside in a chapter focused on the injustice of denying state aid to parochial schools. 12 It is unclear, of course, whether this omission 9. Id. at 4. 10. In a sense, it was that kind of thinking that was responsible for the charge leveled during the 1960 presidential campaign that John Kennedy would be incapable of independent action as president and would simply follow the pope's instructions. See [Vol. 50 is due to inadvertence, a lack of empathy, or a tactical recognition that mentioning the issue might be counterproductive in terms of reaching the audience he wished to persuade.
Finally, the apparent certainty with which Murray held his views, the legalistic form of argument with which he was comfortable, and his emphasis on "winning" seem somewhat quaint today. It is as if the changes for which he was at least partially responsible have made his way of thinking seem foreign to us, if not obsolete. 13 
I. THE CATHOLIC DEMOCRATIC TRADITION
Murray clearly had an important effect on the development of Catholic social and political thought. 14 Nonetheless, there may be a tendency to inflate the importance of Murray's achievement by ignoring or downplaying the work of other Catholic actors and thinkers who were his spiritual antecedents or contemporaries. 15 This is done in part by It moved from abstract metaphysics to interpersonal 'how to be.' It moved from grand conceptual schemes or summae with hundreds of logically interconnected parts to the humble acceptance of mystery. In so doing it largely abandoned the Scholastic framework that had dominated Catholic theology since the thirteenth century.").
14. In addition, it is difficult for us to imagine the degree to which church officials punished Murray for his views. 169 (2015) ("Murray prompted a historic rethinking of Catholic doctrine that came to be expressed in a historic conciliar document."). Murray's impact on the work of the Council should not be underestimated. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that what was accomplished at the Council was made possible by the work of many individuals and was the culmination of certain long-term historical developments. See, e.g., JAY P. CORRIN proposition that "[e]very man is free to embrace and profess that religion which, guided by the light of reason, he shall consider true," as well as the proposition that " [t] he Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church. ' 2 1 While Leo XIII had argued in 1885 that "no one of the several forms of government is itself condemned," and that, it was not "blameworthy in itself.., for the people to have a share greater or less, in the government, ' 22 he also reaffirmed Gregory's denunciations of freedom of worship, expression, and teaching. 2 3 In 1906, Pius X called the separation of church and state "eminently disastrous and reprehensible. '2 4 The situation became more complex, as the Vatican first sought to achieve a modus vivendi with the fascist dictators in the 1920s and the 1930s, 2 5 and later, as World War II was drawing to a close, Pius XII stated that democracy was an appropriate form of government for the times. 26 But that was pretty much the state of play, as Hudock reminds US, 2 7 at least in the minds of the Roman hierarchy, when Murray came upon the scene. The question for them was not just about human rights or freedom of religion, but about the status and value of democracy itself. I say "in the minds of the Roman hierarchy" because the church-that is, the whole "People of God," ' In fact, as Jay Corrin has argued, the "conventional view" that "the Catholic Church has always been the servant of right-wing reaction, fervently resisting change by virtue of its authoritarian structures and traditionalist theology," is valid only insofar as it applies "to the Vatican Curia, a good number of the Roman Catholic episcopacy, and conservative, even reactionary, Catholic intellectuals. ' 3 3 Corrin continues, noting that, "a Catholic liberal, democratic tradition had already been in place for over two hundred years [at the time of the Council]. In fact, the corpus of such thought not only prepared the ground for aggiornamento but also made it possible to implement the changes recommended by Vatican Council I1. '' 34 That tradition finds its roots in the work of many, including Felicite de Lamennais, who traveled to Rome in November 1831 to "appeal[] directly to Pope Gregory XVI to support the reformist position. ' race, and the civil rights movement ... is less about the hierarchy's pronouncements, and more about the day-to-day interactions of local people, sometimes in agreement, sometimes not, who nagged and prodded the hierarchy and laypeople to support the Catholic faith's racial universality." Id. The Vatican also approved of these efforts, as indicated by the support that Vatican officials gave to bishops, such as Archbishop Rummel of New Orleans, who sought to desegregate their dioceses. See MCGREEVY, supra, at 86-87. Indeed, as early as the mid-I 940s, it was reported that the Apostolic delegate to the United States was "'indignant' over the situation of the Negro and our indifference to it." Id. at 71. At the same, McGreevy notes, "few of the Catholic dioceses, busy with traditional school and parish programs, expressed interest in funding education programs on such controversial matters" as racial justice, and "priests nourished in the powerful clerical subculture of the era equated criticism with disloyalty." Id. at 108. McGreevy also recounts numerous instances in which Catholic priests refused absolution to African American Catholics who tried to confess in "White parishes," refused to enroll African American students in parochial schools, and led efforts to maintain segregation in local neighborhoods. Following the publication of Testem Benevolentiae Nostrae, 38 the encyclical in which Leo XIII condemned the "Americanist" heresy, the American bishops adhered more strictly to the party line. 3 9 As Paul Sigmund notes, however, the revival of Thomism encouraged by Leo XIII led scholars like John A. Ryan and Jacques Maritain "to return to the sources in St. Thomas, Suarez, and Bellarmine to find the doctrine of the popular origin of political authority and to apply it to argue that government must be based on the explicit or implicit consent of the people. '40 Maritain's contribution was particularly important, as Paul Sigmund further explains:
Maritain was responsible for a new development in Catholic political thought that had been anticipated but never articulated in terms of the Catholic tradition by earlier French and Italian writers-the argument that democracy was not simply one of several forms of government, all of which were acceptable provided that they promoted "the common good," but was the one form that was most in keeping with the nature of man, and with Christian values. The traditional concern with justice had been expanded to give a religious justification for freedom, and the Christian belief in equality before God was now interpreted to include political and juridical equality as well. 42. See CORRIN, supra note 15, at 5-6 ("The failure of Catholics in the 1920s and 1930s to speak out with a united voice on the evils of fascism and the procrustean definition of the Spanish Civil War as a holy crusade have contributed significantly to the judgment that Catholicism is an agent of reaction, highly suspicious of democracy, liberalism, and state-directed social reform.... It is therefore important to realize that during the era of the twentieth-century dictators a distinct Catholic tradition of pluralist political thought also existed, which championed radical social and economic reform and which, if given more institutional support during the interwar years, might have altered the one-dimensional, simplistic picture of Catholicism as socially conservative and inherently authoritarian."); see also PERREAU-SAUSSINE, supra note 15, at 149-50 ("The church was in principle hostile to religious liberty, because it saw no particular merit in the fact that a heretic could march freely to his own damnation or in the fact that states could foster indifference to truth and a damaging relativism through standing aloof from religious questions.... In the great quarrel of the twentieth century, the church initially sided with reactionary regimes against liberal ones. But the church came to realize that no regime could remain reactionary in the face of the leveling tendencies of egalitarianism .... Totalitarianism showed that the real danger came not from freedom of religion but from political religions that aimed to take the place of Christianity. Freedom of religion provided the most effective bulwark against political religions.").
[Vol. 50 opposed the dictators. 43 Catholics created a democratic constitution in Ireland in 1937 and specifically sought to guarantee human dignity.
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During the Second World War, even the Vatican's position began to soften with official papal statements that "began to draw direct links between freedom, democracy, and the Christian message." '4 5 Following the war, Jacques Maritain and other Catholics greatly influenced the drafting of postwar national constitutions, as well as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 46 Although the Constitution of the United States contains no explicit reference to human dignity, it was a Catholic justice, Frank Murphy, who first included a reference to the concept of dignity in a Supreme Court opinion, 47 and another Catholic justice, William J.
43. See CORRIN, supra note 15, at 220-71, 331-94 (discussing "early Catholic critics of Fascism" and "Catholic critics of Franco"). James Chappel writes that,
In the 1930s, mainstream Catholic intellectuals and leaders made their peace with the secular nation-state like never before. Viewing it as the only antidote to Communism, they were willing to grant immense authoritarian power to the state apparatus, so long as the state signaled its commitment to protect religious liberty and the family while joining the cultural and legal community of "the West." To Maritain and other antifascist Catholics, this gave up too much that was distinctive about the Catholic tradition-namely, its persistent suspicion of the state, and its desire to imagine a social order defined by civil society organizations free of state domination....
. Maritain pursued what he called a "pluralist" or "fraternal" politics-in explicit contrast to the "paternal" vision that, in his opinion, salvaged the least Catholic elements of the Middle Ages. For Maritain, the central elements to be retained were antistatism and federalism, not the zeal for authority and hierarchy. help but perceive a strong tradition of Catholic thought and action supportive of human rights and democracy that dates back virtually to the time of the first democratic revolutions. Murray is a key figure in the ratification of that tradition at the Council, and it should not diminish his achievement to acknowledge that there were important Catholic voices in the move to reconcile democracy and Catholicism long before he was writing in the 1950s.
II. CHANGE AND THE CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE
My second point builds upon two of Professor Lovin's observations, namely, that the world changed dramatically almost as soon as Murray published his book, and that part of Murray's project was to try and "convince Protestants like my pastors and my parents that Catholics could be good Americans, too." '53 It is clearly true that the world changed dramatically after Murray's book was published, but it is also important to recognize that the world had changed-and was continuing to change-in significant ways before and during the years that Murray was writing the essays collected in We Hold These Truths. After all, Murray was writing in the aftermath of the Second World War-a war that profoundly affected many aspects of American life, not the least of which were those connected with the United States' emergence as a world power. 54 In many respects, it was a time of national optimism and selfconfidence, but it was also a time of national conformity and fear, as the first flush of victory gave way to the Korean Conflict, McCarthyism, and the Cold War. 5 5 For many, it was a time of great (and unrealistic) faith in the strength of American institutions, in American expertise and American know-how, and in American destiny. 5 6 It was also a time of great deference to claims of expertise and authority. 5 7 But for some, as 53. Conference Paper, supra note 3, at 1.
See, e.g., DAVID BRINKLEY, WASHINGTON GOES TO WAR xiv (1988) ("The war
transformed not just the government. It transformed Washington itself. A languid Southern town with a pace so slow that much of it simply closed down for the summer grew almost overnight into a crowded, harried, almost frantic metropolis struggling desperately to assume the mantle of global power, moving haltingly and haphazardly and only partially successfully to change itself into the capital of the free world."); see also id. at 281-82. ("The city had come out ofthe war as the capital of the only major country in the world on the winning side, or any side, to survive without a scratch. But those looking for a return to the quiet, easy Washington life they had known in peacetime would not find it. That world was gone. It was replaced by a world that demanded American military power to occupy Japan and to save what was left of western Europe."). we know, it was also a time of quiet desperation, unfulfilled expectations, and an experience of injustice that were rooted in prejudice and intolerance, whether based on race, religion, ideology, political commitments, gender, sexual orientation, or other markers of difference or otherness. 5 8 Perhaps most important for purposes of this commentary, it was a time of transition for Roman Catholics in American public life. 5 9 As with most stories of the 1950s, the story of Roman Catholic transition is a bit more complicated than that which is often told. AntiCatholicism had certainly not disappeared, 60 59. Archbishop Rembert G. Weakland of Milwaukee noted in a 1992 interview that Catholics had been "insiders" at the beginning of the American republic, but had become "outsiders" because of "the large immigrant movements [that] were not totally assimilated into the American political and cultural scene." Articulating the Vision: An Interview with Rembert G. Weakland, 46 THE CRITIC 2, 11 (1992). According to Weakland, the "outsider" period lasted down to the first decades after World War II. At that point we began to move very clearly from being outsiders to being insiders again. The problem we face today is that we must continue to try to reach our people as insiders and not think we can fall back on the older pastoral practices that were meant for that immigrant Church which saw itself as outsiders. areas of life and in many parts of the country.61 Although Murray clearly thought that a substantial part of his task was to convince the Protestant man on the street "that Catholics could be good Americans, too,"
' 62 that was certainly less true than had previously been the case. Catholics had made great strides in many areas, and especially so in politics and government. 6 3 Indeed, one need only recall the immense following that Senator Joseph McCarthy, a Wisconsin Catholic, developed in the early part of the decade and the immense power that he wielded because of that 62. Conference Paper, supra note 3, at 1. 63. In a 1962 book, Monsignor Francis J. Lally SJ, the editor of Boston's archdiocesan newspaper (and simultaneously chairman of the Boston Redevelopment Authority), noted that Catholic activism had been largely limited to labor issues in the early part of the twentieth century, but that changed in the Depression and New Deal years.
The Depression and the Roosevelt years ... were a providential opportunity for Catholics, now for the most part second or third generation descendants of immigrants, to make their voices heard in changing the nation's social situation .... It was not until these years that we can speak in realistic terms of a widespread Catholic social consciousness and with it a willingness not simply to adapt to the community life but also to work to transform it. This move ... changed the mood of American Catholics and provided them with a new assurance in public affairs which ... had been nearly nonexistent. [Vol. 50 following. McCarthy's success was the product of his rabid (and highly irresponsible) anti-Communism-an area where the public theology of his church was entirely consistent with the sense of the country and the spirit of the times. 64 In addition, Americans would soon elect a Catholic president-the only important public office that remained to be won. 6 5 That is not to say, of course, that religion was not an issue in the 1960 election. John F. Kennedy's religion was a source of concern for many, particularly for prominent American Protestant clergy, some of whom met secretly in Switzerland to plan Kennedy's defeat. 66 But the country-and the place of Catholics in it-had changed. In 1960, for example, the Great Depression and the Second World War were still fresh in people's minds. Kennedy's successful political career, like that of many others, was due in part to his record of wartime military service. 67 in that capacity, had stood alone against the Governor of Vermont in opposing the termination of a university professor suspected of communist sympathies. 8 1 Unlike Bishop Sheen, Bishop Joyce was not a television star and did not cast a long shadow on the national scene. He was simply the pastorally-minded leader of a relatively insignificant, largely rural diocese, much loved across denominational lines. But a clue to his importance may be found on the copyright page of Murray's book. It was Bishop Joyce who gave his imprimatur to We Hold These Truthsand to many other "progressive" theological works of the period. society, one notable exception was the continued negative assessment of the Catholic Church by the Protestant elite, including clergy and public theologians. 83 One tangible-and quite dramatic-manifestation of that attitude was the previously mentioned meeting that a prominent group of American Protestant clergy convened in Switzerland in 1960 for the express purpose of trying to prevent the election of a Catholic president. 84 But the attitude went well beyond Protestant clergy and public theologians. Take the case of Phi Beta Kappa, for example. Until 1962, there were only two Phi Beta Kappa chapters at Catholic universities, and only four more were added during the 1960s. 85 It was thought that the doctrines of the Catholic Church were antithetical to the notion of free inquiry and the search for truth. Sister Jeanne Marie jumped through many hoops to secure the charter, and, once it was granted, she found that she had to jump through many additional hoops to keep it, as other Phi Beta Kappa chapters registered their objections to granting a charter to a Catholic college. Id. at 48-49. Because of those objections, the General Secretary of Phi Beta Kappa asked St. Catherine's to respond to the proposition that, "following the Pope and the Church [is] 'antagonistic' to the religious, philosophical, and political principles of the United States and Phi Beta Kappa." Id. at 48. St. Catherine's eventually kept its chapter, but part of Sister Jeanne Marie's acerbic response to the General Secretary's request is worth reading:
At first thought, one might wonder why anyone would raise the question of Church affiliation when a purely academic matter is under consideration. But on second thought, one realizes that, of course the persons entrusted with the academic distinction are also persons who live according to the precepts of their churches. Would that we could dissolve prejudice with truth more whole seen, and allay fear by more frequent good example. Perhaps in admitting Catholics to membership in their Society, Phi Beta Kappa will increase its burden somewhat, but if we are not already all the present members think we should be, even academically, ought they not be willing to regard us as brothers and be our keepers, lifting us to their level, so that we may do our work better in this
In the 1950s, the mainline Protestant churches still had great (perhaps inordinate) influence in governmental affairs, and the views of Protestant public theologians, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, greatly influenced the nation's political leaders-many of whom belonged to the same organizations and networks. 87 In other words, the Protestant public theologians and intellectuals sat at the "high table" from which Catholics had long been excluded, and a substantial part of Murray's project was necessarily focused on securing a place at that table for representatives of the Catholic Church. It was not so much that the Protestant man on the street still needed to be persuaded that Catholics "could be good Americans;" 88 that case had largely (if not entirely) been made and won. 8 9 It was more the case that those who could speak for the Catholic Church needed to be included in the deliberations dominated by the Protestant establishment. In many ways, We Hold These Truths was a brief for including representatives of the Catholic Church at the "high table."
Professor Lovin notes that the world changed dramatically almost immediately after the publication of We Hold These Truths. 9 0 As we have seen, however, the world already had changed substantially while Murray was writing the essays collected in his book. Moreover, there were important aspects of the world in which Murray lived that he either did not grasp or was not willing to write about. 9 1 Thus, while Murray's book nation of ours? Id. As late as 1960, according to John McGreevy, Phi Beta Kappa denied Notre Dame's request for a chapter "in part because required philosophy 'courses are rather too wholly and specifically Thomistic."' MCGREEVY, supra note 37, at 141. In 1967, representatives of several American Catholic universities, under the leadership of Notre Dame President Father Theodore Hesburgh, issued a Statement on the Nature of the Contemporary Catholic University (the so-called Land O'Lakes Statement), which, among other things, stated that a Catholic university "must be a university in the full modem sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and concern for academic excellence" and "a true autonomy and academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the academic community itself." Statement on the Nature of the Contemporary Catholic University, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME ARCHIVES (July 23, 1967) The Supreme Court has ruled that the doctrine of "separate but equal" educational facilities for Negroes is incompatible with the present-day American constitutional concept of civic equality within the unity of the body politic. The decision is a good example of the way in which sociological alterations sharpen moral judgment and thus lead to legal changes.
From the moral point of view, the "separate but equal" doctrine was always unjust; racial discrimination cannot be defended on moral grounds. Nonetheless, the doctrine could once have been defended from a sociological point of view as necessary in the circumstances-in view of the unenlightened state of the public conscience, the temporarily inferior cultural status of the Negro, etc. However, circumstances have changed and the level of the public conscience has risen above ancient irrational prejudices. The sociological defense of the doctrine is no longer admissible. Therefore, the moral judgment must prevail. And the law should conform itself to this moral judgment. The doctrine of separate but equal facilities, which never had any status in morals, no longer has any status in law.
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It may well be that Murray simply did not consider the position of African Americans as a subordinate caste to be a matter of pressing importance during the 1950s. On the other hand, Murray's failure to address the subject may have been a tactical concession in light of the interests of his intended audience. The injustice of racial subordination was not a central concern for many of the mainstream Protestant public intellectuals Murray wanted to persuade, 9 6 and raising the issue would not have strengthened his brief for Catholic inclusion-a brief that might already have seemed difficult enough to argue. To have raised questions about the morality of racial segregation and discrimination, and their radical incompatibility with constitutional and democratic principles, might well have frustrated the achievement of his main objective: the validation and naturalization of the Catholic point of view. Yet, how 96. See JAMES H. CONE, THE CROSS AND THE LYNCHING TREE 159 (2011) ("Whites could claim a Christian identity without feeling the need to oppose slavery, segregation, and lynching as a contradiction of the gospel for America. Whether we speak of Jonathan Edwards, Walter Rauschenbusch, or Reinhold Niebuhr as America's greatest theologian, none of them made the rejection of white supremacy central to their understanding of the gospel. Reinhold Niebuhr could write and preach about the cross with profound theological imagination and say nothing of how the violence of white supremacy invalidated the faith of white churches."). James Cone further notes that, " [b] ecause Niebuhr identified with white moderates in the South more than with their black victims, he could not really feel their suffering as his own." Id. at 39. Lacking "the 'heart to feel' it as his own," Niebuhr never viewed "the problem of race [as] one of his central theological or political concerns." Id. at 41. According to Cone, Niebuhr did not engage the race issue-the greatest moral problem in American history-in any practical way. During most of Niebuhr's life, lynching was the most brutal manifestation of white supremacy, and he said and did very little about it. Should we be surprised, then, that other white theologians, ministers, and churches followed suit? Id. at 44-45. Interestingly, "Niebuhr wrote four books on American history but did not deal with racial issues in any substantive manner." Id. at 51. Indeed, when Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., reviewed a manuscript of one of those books, he pointed out the need to say something in the book about "the relationship between our democratic and equalitarian pretensions and our treatment of the Negro," but Niebuhr made no addition to the text. Id.
[Vol. 50 could one argue, as Murray did, about "the American proposition," without acknowledging the enduring consequences of its fatal flaw, what William Lloyd Garrison long ago called "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell"? 9 7 Perhaps there is a message here, namely, that public theology may have more in common with politics than with prophesy, and that it is important for its practitioners to recognize that fact. 98
III. THE QUESTION OF RACE: LESSONS FROM SAINT Louis UNIVERSITY
No one who has even a passing familiarity with the struggle for racial equality in the United States during the period from the 1940s through the 1960s 9 9 could help but be surprised by the absence of any discussion of that issue in We Hold These Truths. The origin of that absencewhether it be inadvertence, a lack of vision, an absence of understanding or empathy, or a tactical judgment-we do not know. 100 , 2018) , https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/opinion/ evangel ical-brett-kavanaugh-civi l-rights.html ("Conservative evangelicals were at the White House last week for an event the Rev. Robert Jeffress describes as 'a half state dinner and a half campaign rally.' Evangelicals like Mr. Jeffress are ebullient as the Senate prepares to confirm Judge Brett Kavanaugh next week, praising President Trump as 'the most pro-life, pro-religious liberty, pro-conservative judiciary president of any president in history.'. . . As proponents of 'Christian nationalism' continue to be the most consistent base of support for President Trump, my evangelical faith compels me to challenge the way reactionary conservatives have hijacked our faith to serve their narrow interests. With Judge Kavanaugh on the Supreme Court, their 40-year effort to overturn expansions of Fourteenth Amendment protections by the Warren Court may be in reach. This will not necessarily save unborn children, but it will make life more difficult for minorities, workers, poor people and the L.G.B.T.Q. community. When Jesus said, 'I have come that they might have life, and have it more abundantly' in John 10:10, he wasn't thinking about a victory for those who have used religion to fight back against the gains of the civil rights movement. Jesus was inviting all of us to work together for the vision at the heart of that movement-a beloved community where all people created in God's image can thrive.").
99. See The initial question concerns the admission of colored students to our schools-have they a "right" to be admitted?
The answer is-no. For the simple reason that nobody, be he white or colored, has any such right. Our schools are private schools, not diocesan or State. And we have no officium iuridicum towards anybody at all in the mater of admission to them, in such wise that we would violate a right by refusing admission. Even if the colored student were refused admittance simply because of his color, I do not see that this would be unjust, a violation of a right.
Nor is the doctrine of the Mystical Body, or papal encyclicals immediately relevant in this connection. We are not juridically obligated to admit students to our schools simply because they are members of the Mystical Body. Whatever rights that high privilege creates (cf. infra), it certainly creates no rights as against the Society. It should be remembered that we have no juridical obligation to provide an education for anybody, white or colored; with us, education is a work of charity, not justice. Murray continued, noting that the case was different with respect to the obligations of bishops. However, even in that case, where the bishops had an obligation to provide a Catholic education to Catholic children, regardless of race, there was no obligation to provide African American children with a nonsegregated education:
The case is otherwise as regards the bishops. They have a strict obligation to provide for the Catholic education of their flocks, white and colored. And the negro's right to a Catholic education is valid as against the bishops.
I would add immediately that the negro's right to a Catholic education does not immediately and per se create a right to get it in association with white boys and girls in the same school. I fail to see why his right would not be fully satisfied by episcopal provision of an education system for colored alone, i.e., on the principle of segregation. [Vol. 50 schools or separate schools) will depend on other considerations than those of abstract commutative justice. However, in consequence of a failure to provide adequate educational facilities for the colored alone, the colored man's right to a Catholic education becomes operative against white schools, and he should injustice be admitted to them.
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Murray then reiterated his view that the Jesuits had no duty to provide an education to African American students, based on considerations of "individual justice," but conceded that an argument for doing so might be made on other grounds:
As regards ourselves,. . . I do not think that a case can be made out, on grounds of individual justice, for the admission of colored boys to our schools.
But a case can be made out on other grounds: (1) those of social justice and social charity; and (2) those of supernatural charity.
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In other words, while no individual has a right to equal treatment without regard to his or her race, an argument for granting admission might be made on grounds of "social justice and social charity" or "supernatural charity. ' 1 06 Murray ultimately concludes for that reason that "negro students [ideally should be admitted] to our schools;" at the same time he reiterates that no "individual negro" has any "right to a Catholic education." 107 Finally, Murray adds a caveat, namely, that prudence must be considered, even where, ideally, the "admission of colored students" might otherwise be required:
A note needs to be added. Obviously social justice obliges us to do only what is possible at the moment, at the same time that we keep the ideal in view. If, therefore, admission of colored students is not immediately possible in this school or that, there is no obligation to admit them. But there remains an obligation to prepare the way for their admission by sustained and serious and intelligent educative work, on parents and boys. (Notice that, since social justice obliges us to further a process, it always imposes some obligation-that of taking the step in the process that is immediately possible.) RIGHTS TRADITION 87 (1979) ("Respect for persons demands active participation in the process of social change and development. Such participation is the condition for the realization of all human potentialities. None of these potentialities can or will be realized as long as persons remain in a condition of extreme marginalization and powerlessness.").
108. Murray, supra note 103.
Murray then criticized the arguments in favor of desegregation on several grounds, including the following:
[Father Heithaus, who championed de-segregation] oversimplifies the problem; his rhetoric is exaggerate; in his attack on existing attitudes (which do indeed deserve attack) he is tendentious and unfair. Granted that he is on the side of toe [sic] angels, he is entirely too heavy-footed in a very delicate matter. And that sort of thing is likely to do more harm than good. It seems to me that he succumbs to one common temptation. Viewing our past neglect and present inertia (both real enough, I think), one is tempted to make up for lost time, and do everything at once. In the face of others who move too slowly, there is an inclination to move too fast. And when one takes up a "cause," such as that of interracial justice, there is a tendency to edge off into some manner of fanaticism. 109 As a legal matter, Murray was clearly correct. As a private institution, Saint Louis University was not constitutionally obliged to admit African American students. 1 10 Indeed, even public universities had no recognized obligation to do so, as a general matter, in 1945.111 But the logicchopping, forensic quality of Murray's argument is something that only a lawyer could love. It distracts; it fails to elucidate; it diminishes our ability to appreciate the inherent evil of racism. That forensic or adversarial mode of argument is not one that appeals to most of us today, 1 12 but it does reflect the emphasis that Murray placed, as Professor Lovin puts it, on "winning the argument."' 13 Ironically, one result of Murray's work has been to free us from that earlier form of argument. We are more comfortable today thinking about encounter in terms of what I would call dialogue, in which the participants are open to persuasion based on what David Tracy calls "an openness to mutual transformation,"1 14 as opposed to Murray's kind of adversarial contest in which there are winners and losers. Encounter cannot be authentic-and will only be window dressing-unless it sustains that possibility of mutual transformation. If we allow forensic argument to deaden us to realities such as the inherent evil of racism, we are more likely to be persuaded that prudence or moderation is the greatest virtue. But one must wonder at what point prudence becomes an excuse for a lack of moral courage. To what extent, in Dr. King's words, does the "great stumbling block" become "the white moderate, who is more devoted to 'order' than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice"?' 15
CONCLUSION
Public theologians necessarily speak out of a particular faith tradition, and it seems essential for them to look inwardly to their tradition as well as outwardly to the public square, to challenge aspects of their own traditions when necessary, and to articulate alternative narratives. They should be alert to the signs of the times and be willing to speak prophetically within their faith communities. As Professor Lovin has noted, 1 16 that was one of the two tasks that Murray set for himself, with respect to the Catholic Church's official teaching on religious freedom.
That inward-directed aspect of public theology seems at least as important now as it was in Murray's time. In recent years, we have seen the American Catholic bishops form alliances and fight battles over questions that most often relate in one way or another to matters of sex. 117 In the 2016 general election, some bishops went so far as to tell Catholics that they should withhold their vote from "any candidate" who did not oppose abortion, thereby implicitly directing Catholics to vote for Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, simply because of his stance on that issue, and without regard to any other issue. 118 Sometimes it seems that this is the only message that some of the bishops are able to find in the Gospels, and the only thing that they want to talk about. 
